

'B-theoretic endurantists have responded to the problem of temporary intrinsics in several ingenious ways. They have provided analyses of intrinsic property change in terms of, e.g., adverbial properties, relations to times, and distributional properties. I shall argue that, despite the initial plausibility of such analyses, B-theoretic endurantists are unable to solve the version of the problem of temporary intrinsics involving, in particular, the proper (spatial, or spatiotemporal) parts of human persons.

To put things more simply: B-theoretic endurantists don't have a plausible way of accounting for the fact that we regularly change parts. The worry arises when we consider the question of how to account for such change in light of two other questions. The first is the so-called "special composition question": In what circumstances do various objects compose a further object? The second is the question of whether we have any genuinely nonredundant causal powers – say, nonredundant causal mental powers. I argue that these questions are related in such a way that lead B-theorists down one of two possible paths: either to the outright denial of our persistence, or to an account of property change in which temporal parts inevitably crop up. Both paths involve the rejection of endurantism.

I end by briefly considering whether non-presentist A-theorists are better positioned to account for our ability to change parts.'